Researchers engaged in qualitative research use a variety of techniques, such as observation, participant-observation, interviews, document analysis, oral history, narrative, life history, and film to explore the way social actors experience their world and make meaning of that experience. Because the researcher him-or herself is the instrument that gathers and records information on these social activities, a prolific literature has developed regarding researchers' training, theoretical justifications of methodology, and criteria for evaluating qualitative studies. This literature represents the professional struggle to confront two ineluctable difficulties facing qualitative research: the impossibility of objectivity and the political nature of all social inquiry-what Schwandt (1994) calls "the paradox of how 258 Authors' Note: We wish to thank the anonymous reviewers of earlier versions of this article for their responses.
to develop an objective interpretive science of subjective human experience" (p. 119). As Goffman (1971) , the founder of ethnomethodology, argues in rejecting positivist social science, "a sort of sympathetic magic seems to be involved [in positivist social science], the assumption being that if you go through the motions attributable to science, science will result. But it hasn't" (p. xvi). Consequently, the history of qualitative research is one of increasing complexity as researchers and theorists recognize and struggle with the dilemmas presented by these two perdurable difficulties.
More recently, qualitative research has engaged the postmodern critique of writing as a discursive system unanchored by a secure theory of reference and deprived of a transcendental truth available to ground argument and judgment. The interpretive turn in rhetoric and the social sciences has led researchers and theorists to struggle with problems of representation, of the inclusion and co-optation of participants' voices, and of validity. Critics have argued that the representation of other cultures is structured by disciplinary and genre conventions rather than by objective description (see Behar & Gordon, 1995; Cintron, 1993; Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Doheny-Farina, 1993; Herndl, 1991; Van Maanen, 1988) . They have pointed out that research too often silences the voices of women and other "excentrics," other persons traditionally excluded from positions of cultural power (see Fonow & Cook, 1991; Hartstock, 1987; Lather, 1991, pp. 33-36) . And they have argued that traditional notions of validity are inapplicable at best and, at worst, bankrupt (see Altheide & Johnson, 1994; Guba & Lincoln, 1989) . These critiques of ethnographic authority and the authority of qualitative research generally emerged from debates about epistemology and ontology and have traditionally been treated as rhetorical problems leading to textual experimentation (see Denzin, 1997; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Tanaka, 1997; Tyler, 1987) and to conceptions of fluid or catalytic validity (see Blakeslee, Cole, & Conefrey, 1996; Lather, 1991) .
We write this article because we are committed to the idea that qualitative research elicits an understanding of communication practices and the social practices and subjectivities they produce in ways that other kinds of research cannot. Yet, we are also caught up in the many dilemmas the qualitative researcher faces once he or she recognizes the implications of the postmodern critique we have outlined. This situation leads us to a position very much like that Ebert (1991) calls "resistance postmodernism," a position that accepts critiques of knowledge and power but is committed to social change. A resistant postmodernism tries to avoid the disabling fragmentation of what Ebert (1991) calls "ludic postmodernism," in which the possibility of political or social action retreats into the endless free play of signifiers. Similar to P. Sullivan and Porter (1997) in their discussion of critical research practices, we worry that postmodern self-reflection can create problems. "How," they ask, "can research proceed if the very methods used are always open to scrutiny" (p. 64)? We think that these problems emerge from the current disciplinary situation in which both a modernist faith in method and a postmodern suspicion of grand narratives (Lyotard, 1984) exist within the same institutional space. Our anxiety over these dilemmas-and we pretend here to speak for many of our colleagues as well as for ourselves-comes from our being part of a discipline that embraces the postmodern critique but feels an institutional need for the certainty and power of the modernist project. Researchers want to get things done, whether that be improving a specific task of rhetorical production or effecting fundamental cultural change, through a meaningful and persuasive research practice that motivates action.
In what follows, we suggest a new way of thinking about these issues and a new way of responding to them. Specifically, whereas most scholars writing about qualitative research assume that a researcher's "purpose is shaped by epistemological and methodological commitments" (Schwandt, 1994, p. 119) , we argue that the reverse is true. We suggest that a researcher's commitments to specific forms of social action shape theoretical and philosophical commitments. As Kirsch (1992) has argued, "most research in composition studies is opportunistic; researchers choose the methodology that will best address their questions" (p. 252). But these research questions emerge not only from disciplinary technologies but also from the purposes and interests that researchers bring to their work as social actors. We believe that these prior social experiences and commitments drive researchers' attachment to one theoretical position or another.
Working from this assumption, we propose a model of research practices because it does two things. First, it helps us understand qualitative research as a social activity through which a researcher helps to maintain or change social practices such as pedagogy or professional discourse. It moves us beyond the relatively sterile notion of paradigms with their metaphysical debates about epistemology to describe qualitative research as a situated rhetorical practice that can change the way we teach or, potentially, affect the way professionals writing in the workplace conduct their activity. As P. Sullivan and reception of texts"-as opposed to the traditional focus on the production of texts-a trend he sees as attempting to reunite the activities of reading and writing; (b) "social and political issues" such as gender and collaboration; and (c) "the move towards methodological diversity" to include not only quantitative studies but also "ethnographic methods, case studies, discourse analysis, speech act theory, qualitative historical methods, social construction theory, poststructuralist approaches especially in the area of semiotics of visual representation, and rhetorical analyses that include feminist theory and NeoAristotelian theory" (p. 39). Because it is diverse and interdisciplinary, technical and professional communication "may be housed in a number of different disciplines-including English, engineering, and business" (Blyler, Graham, & Thralls, 1997, p. 79) . And this interdisciplinarity goes some way, we think, toward explaining the variety of purposes that researchers bring to the work we review here.
FROM TAXONOMIZING PARADIGMS TO TRACING PRACTICES
Most taxonomies of qualitative research identify major research paradigms and categorize them according to their ontological and epistemological commitments. Guba and Lincoln's (1994, p. 109) influential taxonomy of qualitative research, for example, differentiates four major paradigms-positivist, postpositivist, critical theory, and constructionist-according to the differences in their ontological, epistemological, and methodological commitments. In this model, the positivist paradigm assumes a realist ontology in which the external world has a stable, apprehensible reality about which verifiable truth claims can be made-the position from which someone might confidently utter, "I was there. I saw it. This is what happened." At the opposite extreme, the constructionist position espouses an ontological relativism in which there are only local, constructed realities about which researchers make claims that depend on an intersubjective process of inquiry and that are always embedded in a reflexive hermeneutic circle. The postpositivist and critical theory paradigms lie in between on this model. The postpositivist paradigm is usually located closer to the positivist position and is probably the most commonly held position in qualitative research. Researchers holding this position tend to assume that the real exists but that they can never know it completely or accurately. Objectivity is not possible but is a regulatory ideal toward which researchers aim through the rigorous use of disciplinary methods such as triangulation and multimodal analysis-what J. K. Smith (1989) calls the "methodological middle ground" (p. 157). For critical theory, reality is historical and contingent but apprehensible through a fieldwork framed by theoretical analysis, and knowledge is produced through a dialectic of research and theory.
Not everyone need accept this particular division of qualitative research into these four major paradigms, but the notion of research paradigms identified by their theoretical assumptions about knowledge claims is a standard way of thinking in rhetoric. The paradigm has been the lingua franca of the humanities and social sciences since Kuhn's (1970) famous book on scientific revolutions, and the strategy of organizing rhetorical movements according to their epistemological assumptions is made familiar by Berlin's (1988) influential discussion of expressive, cognitive, and social rhetorics. And, we hasten to add, the notion of research paradigms is popular because of the efficiency with which this model organizes a vast array of material. We offer a different model, however, because we think that people working in disciplines engage in research practices rather than research paradigms. Thinking of research as belonging to one paradigm or another leads us to think about metaphysical debates and about the finished products: research reports. It suggests questions such as "How do you do this research?" and "What justifies this procedure?" Thinking about research as an ongoing social practice, however, leads us to consider why researchers do their work, the variation and changes in research practices, and the relationship between research practices and social, economic, and institutional power. This leads us to ask "What kinds of work do you do and why?" and "Whose interests does this work serve?" Such a shift in focus offers a richer understanding of the purposes, consequences, and problems of the many qualitative research practices that currently exist in technical and professional communication.
In making the distinction between practices and paradigms, we adopt Bourdieu's (1977) theory of social practice. Bourdieu suggests that the structural analysis dominating traditional interpretive anthropology and sociology be replaced with a theory of social practices understood as ongoing and changing processes. He argues that the dominant structural style of social analysis is determined by the researcher's relationship to the social activity under observation and that this distorts the social reality in question.
The anthropologist's particular relation to the object of his study contains the makings of a theoretical distortion inasmuch as his situation as an observer, excluded from the real play of social activities by the fact that he has no place (except by choice or by way of a game) in the system observed and has no need to make a place for himself there, inclines him to a hermeneutic representation of practices, leading him to reduce all social relations to communicative relations and, more precisely, to decoding relations. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 1) As an outsider observing and recording the social activity in field notes and interviews, the researcher objectifies the activity. The researcher's observations turn social life into a text to be interpreted. This freezes the continuous process of social activity into a static linguistic structure open to analysis. Bourdieu continues, "In taking up a point of view on the action, withdrawing from it in order to observe it from above and from a distance, [the researcher] constitutes practical activity as an object of observation and analysis, a representation" (p. 2). This sort of analytic freeze-frame creates what current critiques of anthropology call the ethnographic present, the (un)necessary fiction that researchers can talk about a culture in the present tense as if it were unified, stable, and coherent. Descended from Saussure's (1966) structural linguistics, this structural perspective allows the analyst to deduce a set of rules by which social activities appear to be governed, much like the stable metaphysical distinctions between paradigms in Guba and Lincoln's (1994) taxonomy. Bourdieu (1977) argues that this analytic process reifies activity and social relations into an artificial structure. Furthermore, the structure of rules and distinctions that this analysis produces is an artifact of the anthropologist's analytic practice rather than of the ongoing social activity under study. Thus, analytic observation produces a systematically distorted representation of how life is actually lived by social actors. Bourdieu argues that social actors do not live in a world of rules and the certainty they provide. Rather, actors operate by their practical sense of what is an appropriate action in the changing and unique circumstances in which they find themselves.
To explain his theory, Bourdieu (1977) discusses the cultural practice of gift exchange. The objectivist or structural analysis of gift exchange reduces the activity to a set of rules dictating the when, how, and what of the gift and countergift sequence. But there are many possibilities for misfires and subtle but socially meaningful variations in the exchange process that the structural model of strict rule-governed behavior cannot capture. Bourdieu argues that "the observer's totalizing apprehension substitutes an objective structure fundamentally defined by its reversibility for an equally objectively irreversible succession of gifts which are not mechanically linked to the gifts they respond to or insistently call for" (p. 5). What the structural model sees as a set of reversible or interchangeable and predictable gifts is really not so predictable; the gifts are irreversible actions moving into an uncertain future and changing the social context of the response. You never really know exactly what gift you will get in return or what social value it will have in context. Against this structural model of the predictable exchange of gifts, Bourdieu (1977) sets the phenomenological model, which attempts to capture the meaning of the activity as it is experienced by individual social actors. This subjective phenomenological method misses the fact that the individual's experience is possible only within the structured system of reciprocity described by the objectivist structural analysis. So social activity is seemingly caught between two opposed and insufficient analytic models, one objective and one subjective. Bourdieu's theory of practice encompasses both of these antagonistic truths and escapes the objectivism of the structural model and the subjectivism of phenomenology by asserting the temporal structure of gift exchange. What looks like static, rule-governed exchange from the outside really exists as an uncertain process extended in time. Many things happen between the initial gift and the giving of the countergift. But the practical sense of appropriate action that social actors use to guide their actions and give meaning to their experiences is conditioned by the social principles that they have in their tacit knowledge of how to get along successfully in the world. Seen in retrospect, practice looks like rule-governed activity, but it does not play that way on the ground.
Certainly, qualitative research in technical and professional communication is not a ritual exchange of gift-unless you think of publication and tenure as ritual gifts exchanged in an uncertain and extended process. But this model of practice helps us understand how researchers in what Williams (1977, pp. 121-127) calls an emergent field, such as technical and professional communication, appropriate qualitative research traditions as part of their disciplinary work. In emergent fields where scholars are adopting research methodologies from other fields, researchers' purposes are determined by their position within their academic fields and the tasks that that position makes interesting (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 1-21) . A purely objective analysis places epistemological and methodological commitments first as logically prior, but this abstracted version of the relationship belies the way social practices unfold in time; it suggests that actors are purely rational and that practices are determined by an abstract analysis that escapes ideology and situated interests. As Bourdieu (1977) argues, social practices are not guided by the neat system of rules that analysts construct through a retrograde analysis of social action. Rather, social practices unfold in time, guided by practitioners' sense of appropriate action. We add that in the case of disciplinary practices such as qualitative research, this sense of appropriate action is powerfully influenced by the conditions in the discipline, which shape the purposes researchers bring to their projects. Judging what is an appropriate action or a suitable research purpose is more a social, institutional, and ideological matter than a metaphysical deliberation.
We might also think of practices as an extension of the familiar rhetorical notion that knowledge is produced by socially situated rhetorical activity. Bourdieu's (1977) theory of practice expands our understanding of situated activity to include the material, economic, and institutional as well as the ideological conditions that shape social activities such as the production of knowledge. And his theory captures the fact that these activities are ongoing processes, open to error, variation, and change. Researchers adopt a qualitative methodology as part of their sense of what works and what will lead them toward interesting and productive research that serves a purpose they already espouse. The methodology is a tool used by a researcher who, having some notion of his or her purpose and project laid out ahead of time, feels his or her way through the development of the process. F. J. Sullivan (1997) illustrates Bourdieu's (1977) theory when he points out that his case study "did not begin with choosing a standard method to observe practice, nor did it begin with a research question drawn from that practice or from a theory. Rather . . . [the] study developed as a way to make sense of a situation rife with contradiction" (p. 315). Bourdieu's (1977) theory of practice has two benefits for our analysis. First, his emphasis on the material and institutional conditions in which social activity occurs allows us to think about research practices in relation to the changing circumstances of a discipline. We cannot develop this historical analysis here, but we suspect that the ways a discipline aligns itself with larger institutional and social interests may well change as the discipline establishes itself. We believe that emergent disciplines may well align themselves with powerful interests as they establish their scholarly identity and a standard literature, as they consolidate their institutional position, and as they secure funding and credibility. Once established, a discipline or field can resist institutional or social interests with less immediate danger. We suspect that a careful history of the politics of technical and professional communication will reflect this profile. Certainly the growing body of work in feminist and critical studies in the field has moved a great distance from the practical aims of early technical writing programs, which Connors (1982) described as a pragmatic response to industry complaints that engineering graduates could not write adequate technical reports.
The second and more interesting benefit of Bourdieu's (1977) theory for our current argument is that it provides a way to think about social activities such as qualitative research, which recognizes that they are both regulated and open to variation and change. Because they are part of the discipline of technical and professional communication, the practices qualitative researchers have adopted are regulated by objective conditions, such as standard research methodologies, scholarly conventions in rhetoric, the textbook tradition, journal editors' and reviewers' judgments, students' expectations, tenure committees, curricular expectations of writing across the curriculum partners, researchers' consulting practices, and industry careers for graduates (Blakeslee et al., 1996, p. 146; Doheny-Farina, 1993, p. 257; P. Sullivan, 1992, p. 55) . Collectively, these conditions produce the sorts of control on statements and disciplinary knowledge that Foucault (1972) attributes to discourse formations. But research practices are also the product of social activities tied intimately to the researcher's lived experience, what P. Smith (1988) calls a person's "singular history" (p. 158). As members of a variety of social communities, researchers bring different interests and experiences to their work, which in turn, shape researchers' purposes and guide the way they negotiate or violate the constraints of disciplinary regulation. For example, scholars interested in Marxist or feminist theory are often motivated by their social experiences-experiences conditioned, of course, by enduring social structures-and they produce research that resists or broadens disciplinary expectations. Kirsch (1992) underscores the way research practices emerge from lived experience as researchers in rhetoric negotiate the discipline's methodological pluralism. Summarizing Harding's (1986) analysis of social research, Kirsch (1992) writes that "the purpose of the researcher's questions . . . must be grounded in the subject's experience and be relevant to the subject" (p. 256). Kirsch is writing in a slightly different context than we are, but her observation that researchers are opportunistic and that their research purposes are grounded in their experience is similar to ours; that is, research practices exist at the intersection of structural conditions and lived experiences. This suggests that not all researchers within a field, such as technical and professional communication, will do the same kind of work. Their research purposes and goals will vary according to their different experiences and their relationship to disciplinary and institutional conditions, particularly relations of power. Furthermore, this model suggests that as the field of technical and professional communication continues to develop and engage other interdisciplinary fields, such as organizational communication, feminist theory, and critical theory, scholars with different research purposes will appropriate different parts of the qualitative research tradition to pursue their agendas.
To describe research as a situated social activity and to understand the practical problems researchers face when they try to get readers to act on their research, we propose a model of qualitative research practices (see Table 1 ). Our model is organized by a research practice's relationship to institutional and cultural power. It locates researchers and their work along a political and ideological continuum defined by the two questions we introduced earlier: "What kinds of work do you do and why?" and "Whose interests does this work serve?" On the left side of this continuum, research works to maintain existing social and material relations and to promote efficient production. On the right side, research works to change social and institutional relations and identities and to alter the theory and practice of writing. Research we locate in the center of this continuum describes writing practices without a conscious or an overriding purpose to either maintain or change relations of power. Comparing work at either extreme of this continuum presents the sharpest contrast and defines conflicting tendencies in the field. Writing about their own experiences as researchers and consultants, Segal et al. (1998) articulate this conflict nicely when they comment that the understanding of discourse produced by qualitative research might direct [discourse] to better projects, or direct it to existing projects better. But-to return to the overarching concern . . . just what do we mean by "better"? Do we mean better in the sense of operating more effectively in the practical or communicative sense? Or do we mean better in some more rarefied, ideological sense? (p. 75) Despite this tension felt by consultants and researchers, however, the majority of qualitative work in technical and professional communication falls somewhere in the middle of our continuum. A frequency distribution of qualitative research studies would look something like a bell curve-just what you would expect in a disciplinary practice marked by both regulation and innovation. We begin with this large middle ground lest we construct an overly dramatic representation of the field as polarized and driven by political division. Certainly such conflict exists, but most qualitative studies occupy a less partisan position.
RESEARCH AS DESCRIPTION
Starting in the mid-1980s, the descriptive research we locate in the middle of the continuum was inspired by work in the rhetoric of inquiry movement and by the then newly theorized notion of the discourse community. Many researchers sought to explore the rhetorical practices of communities and disciplines to support the argument that knowledge is socially constructed or that specific disciplinary communities had specialized rhetorical practices and to fill in the thick description of how knowledge construction occurs in a variety of sites. As writing across the curriculum and writing in the disciplines programs began to proliferate, researchers provided detailed Most researchers committed to this task recognize that all knowledge, theirs as well as those of the communities they study, is socially constructed, and researchers seek to detail the rhetorical processes and consequences of this construction. Blakeslee et al.'s (1996) language values both "informing practice"-nicely ambiguous between teaching and production-and "what it teaches us"-again nicely ambiguous about the subject of this rhetorical education. The good they mention might refer to either production or social activity or to both. This seems to us a negotiated balance between the two senses of "better" that Segal et al. (1998) describe. Inspired by the notion of discourse communities, qualitative studies of workplaces, technical writing curricula, and scientific laboratories have carefully traced the communicative activities of writers. Olsen (1993) summarizes this movement and describes the kinds of research in which scholars of workplace writing engage in the following:
Recent research on discourse communities explores the way values, assumptions and methods shared by readers and writers in a given community (that is, in an academic or professional field, an organization, a department, or some other group) affect the type and nature of the communication produced and accepted by both the readers and writers in that community. (p. 181) This sense that research should, as Blakeslee et al. (1996) put it, "improve our understanding of the settings and the individuals we study through accounts that describe the rhetorical practices of our participants" (p. 126) in specific workplaces or communities guides the qualitative research studies in the collection in which Olsen's (1993) essay appears and captures the spirit of qualitative reports in other collections (see Bazerman & Paradis, 1991; Matalene, 1989; Spilka, 1993b) . If researchers at either end of our model work to maintain or change institutional order and existing patterns of social activity, the kind of action associated with work in this large middle ground is less clear. Work in this disciplinary center participates in the cultural work of either extreme from time to time. But we think that most of this work tends to be descriptive, amassing carefully detailed studies of rhetorical activity aimed at further research and a pedagogy that improves our understanding rather than motivates specific institutional action. Because such research rarely examines or criticizes the ideological interests of the institutions and workplaces it studies, its effect is to maintain social relations of power. Loehr (1995) describes activity at a small Southeast manufacturing firm implementing cross-functional project team work and concludes that "the philosophical structure of equitable participation through project-team work depends on team members' mutual abilities to define and acknowledge authority" (p. 83). In so doing, she uses standard qualitative research methodology: a case study design, purposeful sampling, interviews, participant-observation, and a physical description of the site. Zimmerman (1993) uses a similar methodology to investigate pedagogical practice. She conducted a semester-long study-based on Guba and Lincoln's (1989) fourth generation methodology as well as on Bowers and Flinders's (1990) classroom as an "ecology" model-to study "how technical writing teachers convey their assumptions about learning and technical writing to students" (Zimmerman, 1993, p. 137) . In her concluding Implications section, Zimmerman (1993) Blakeslee et al. (1996) call meaningful and valuable.
McCarthy (1991) shows how a charter document in psychiatryDiagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) (American Psychiatric Association, 1980)-which "defines as authoritative certain ways of seeing and deflects attention from other ways" (McCarthy, 1991, p. 359) , helps to shape knowledge in a field and therefore the language used by a discourse community to express that knowledge. She uses a triangulated research approach as she observes how a child psychiatrist uses DSM-III in her work: observing and interviewing the doctor as well as reading her data-gathering log; audiotaping her as she orally composes her reports and then studying the written products; and interviewing the doctor's colleagues, who would read and use her reports. Such an approach produces the information needed for McCarthy (1991) to conclude that "the DSM-III has proven to be both a powerful heuristic for psychiatric inquiry and writing" (p. 373) and an educational tool for future psychiatrists. Just as DSM-III describes psychiatric disorders and does not prescribe (or even recommend) treatment, so also is McCarthy's article a descriptive piece.
In a later article written with Gerring, however, McCarthy not only archives the rhetorical activity of practicing psychiatrists but also describes how psychiatric diagnosis and practice are contingent upon economic, political, and social forces that played an important role in the charter document's revision (McCarthy & Gerring, 1994) . This second article thus moves slightly toward the right end of our model (see Table 1 ). By linking the authority of the charter document to a set of economic and political interests, the material critique in this later article makes the possibility of institutional change more likely. Similarly, F. J. Sullivan (1997) moves beyond what Paré (1993, p. 111) has called the "rosy view" (p. 111) of discourse community in a study that "examines ways in which conflicts between management and workers are textually enacted in an IRS Service Center" (F. J. Sullivan, 1997, p. 313) . And in her case study of four entry-level engineers, Winsor (1999) uses not only genre theory but also Vygotskian activity theory to explain how engineers write documentation to "create and maintain the activity system of their work and to reshape it as well" (p. 200). These two final examples illustrating this large middle area also seem to have nascent affiliations with the right side of the model in Table 1 .
RESEARCH AS INSTITUTIONAL MAINTENANCE
The left-hand side of our model in Table 1 represents research intended to make existing organizational processes more efficient, perhaps changing the way things get done but not the organizational ethos and social relations. Focused on expediency, this sort of research tends to maintain existing institutional structures and interests. Certainly there is variation among studies that we locate at this end of the continuum, but they generally use qualitative studies to produce instrumental knowledge. Thus, in a review of qualitative research practices in technical communication, P. Sullivan and Spilka (1992) write,
We consider qualitative research a rich means for exploring important issues in technical communication in depth and breadth, including such critical global concerns in industry as usability, total quality management, technology transfer, and office automation. Regular reading of this type of research can yield strategies for improved communication at your worksite. (p. 603) This instrumentalism often leads researchers and readers toward a positivist attitude toward the world; it can be known reliably, and thus, they can take action with confidence in its outcome.
We call this a (self-)regulated context because this sort of research tends to be directly connected to specific actions, the success or failure of which are often measured by institutional criteria such as efficiency or value-added education. As Bourdieu (1984, pp. 36-74) has argued, the more severe the consequences of action, the more closely controlled and regulated the process will be. Medical or legal practices, for example, are highly regulated because actions have immediate, often irreversible, and sometimes fatal consequences. For technical and professional communication, its communication practices are often part of important industrial or scientific programs, and actions can lead to very expensive organizational problems or to serious mistakes. The many studies of technical communication surrounding accidents, such as the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, attest to the crucial importance of communication practices. Understandably, researchers working in these areas are forced by the context and consequences within which they work to make authoritative claims couched in language amenable to their readers, many of whom embrace the ethos of science and its positivist commitments. As Blyler (1995) has observed, both research funding and the rhetorical demands of audiences often encourage what she calls "functionalist" research aimed at "usefulness as 'the presumed neutral development of knowledge for the realization of corporate goals,' which they [Alverson and Willmott, 1992] identify as 'efficiency and effectiveness'" (p. 291).
We call this a (self-)regulated position to suggest that researchers in this context often share this commitment to instrumental reason and efficiency. We think Blyler (1995) is correct when she surveys research in technical and professional communication and concludes that "it appears, therefore, that a functionalist ideology-even if in a diluted form-continues to influence our research imagination" (p. 293). For scholars in technical and professional communication interested in pedagogy and textbook production, for example, the field tends to embrace what Vitanza (1991) calls the "will to pedagogy," a disciplinary desire for secure, reliable knowledge with which to direct a powerful pedagogy (e.g., see Spilka, 1993a) . Adapting a term from Harvey (1990) , we suggest that the more direct and important the consequences of action and the more regulated the institutional context, the greater the "epistemological horizon" (p. 202) of a research practicethat is, the more certain researchers are that properly conducted research accurately reflects the world. Work at this end of the continuum tends to espouse the virtue of what C. R. Miller (1989) calls techne, invoking Bernstein's (1971) low sense of the practical in technical communication associated with the handbook tradition of instructions and concerned primarily with "the useful (that is, the quality of a product given a set of expectations for it)" (C. R. Miller, 1989, p. 22) . Dorazio and Stovall (1997) illustrate the characteristics of the left side of our continuum in Table 1 . In arguing that product usability testing should be done not in the artificial environment of a testing lab but in a naturalistic setting using ethnographic research methods, Dorazio and Stovall couch their argument in language that reflects a positivistic belief that objectivity can be reached and maintained, that reality can be discovered and recorded. They state that "spoken language usually tells us something about the reality of that particular culture," that concepts "can be empirically verified," and that "asking the right people" (p. 58) helps researchers determine patterns of behavior. They argue that the "unique perspective" of participantobservation "allows the reader [researcher] to be objective in data collection" (p. 62). They refer to field notes as being a record "of events in a certain culture" (p. 62); observational and theoretical notes, respectively, "record activity" and "analytical interpretations" (pp. 62-63). In speaking directly to their readers as researchers, they say that "to the best of your ability, you record what was actually said during interviews and what actually occurred" (p. 63). And in their arguing for on-site usability testing, they note that "task analysis gives the designers a rational basis for design decisions" (p. 63).
As if in answer to one of our two questions, "Whose interests does this work serve?" Dorazio and Stovall (1997) write, Understanding the user's culture from the insider's point of view can give product developers an edge in designing for that particular target audience. Ethnographic studies of a user group provide a way to identify possible design strategies, which could be tested later in the usability laboratory. (p. 59)
The main goal of usability testing is to revise and improve aspects of a product so that users can be more productive and efficient over time. (p. 60). Carroll (1984) and Jones (1996) also serve as apt examples of qualitative research focused on the practical and useful and on usability testing designed to make workers more effective and efficient. Carroll (1984) describes his efforts to create what he calls a "Minimalist Manual" designed to help new users of word-processing programs as a problem with "training." In discussing the design of the manual, he notes that "chapter headings [are] task-oriented," that "all material not related to office work [is] either eliminated or radically edited" (p. 130), and that "learners create their first document only seven pages into the Minimalist Manual" (p. 132). He argues for "task-related motivation" (p. 132), the focus of which is "getting the job done" (p. 136).
Similar to Carroll (1984) , Jones (1996) focuses on issues of usability. As a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) technical writer, she carries "on a low-key usability campaign" (p. 25). And just as Carroll (1984) stresses the importance of providing people with minimalist training-just enough to get the job done-Jones (1996) tries "not to . . . write any documentation that exceeds twenty pages" (p. 25), what could be referred to as minimalist documentation. She speaks of computer applications being developed "in response to perceived administrative needs" (p. 29), urges technical writers to "become technical communicators and join with developers to make products that are usable" (p. 40), and notes that "the status quo holds" (p. 35).
Although in this last comment Jones is referring to the problem of software developers and documentation writers working in a sequential order, her language aptly describes qualitative workplace research on the left-hand side of our continuum (see Table 1 ): research focused on issues of usability, research couched in the language of objective knowledge, and research serving the interests of managers and administrators keen to make their workplaces and their employees more efficient.
The usability studies we have discussed are the clearest case of the instrumental self-regulated research located on the left side of our model in Table 1 . But this instrumental purpose does not exist in hermetically sealed isolation, separate from the archival purposes of the disciplinary middle ground. Dautermann's (1997) ethnographic study of the composition processes of a group of nurses shares features of both instrumental and archival work, suggesting that individual studies can readily embrace multiple purposes.
1 Adopting the distinction between metaphorical and material discourse communities, Dautermann describes the differences and conflicts between the nurses' clinical discourse and the administrative discourse of hospital management. She analyzes these communities because "a primary research question was to determine the effect of sub-group discourses on the composition activity" (p. 34). This focus on composition activities leads her to produce context-sensitive diagrams of the collaborative composing process of the nurses. These careful descriptions seem to reflect the archival purpose behind the studies of workplace writing that Olsen (1993) describes. Indeed, Dautermann (1997) characterizes her project in much the same way:
Aside from revealing dimensions of large writing projects that stretch over long periods of time, this project also provided access to the literacy skills and strategies of professional nonacademic writers, whose primary task is related to a technical skill rather than to expressing that skill in writing. Examining such practitioners can provide insight into patterns of literacy among professionals who write even when the scope of the whole task is beyond direct access. (p. 24) At points, however, the book also seems to participate in the instrumentalism of the left side of our model. Dautermann (1997) points out that she was initially invited to the research site as a consultant hired to make the document storage and retrieval system more efficient. And the issue of efficient documentation runs throughout the study, becoming a major theme in the conflict between clinical and administrative discourses. Noting that new nurses brought a variety of training and work styles to the job, Dautermann points out that the successful revision of the documentation system should provide "the protection of a nurse-friendly manual system, [which] was then directly related to the threat of malpractice, both to the individual nurse and to the hospital" (p. 48). Thus, this study demonstrates the way archival and instrumental purposes sometimes overlap. Its hybrid nature underscores the way studies can be crossed by multiple purposes and slide across adjacent areas of our model.
RESEARCH AS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Research located on the right side of the continuum of Table 1 answers the question of "Whose interests does this work serve?" by announcing a commitment to critiquing and changing communication practices and the social or ideological arrangements they support. Inspired by the critique of instrumental reason and liberal politics present in works such as Marcuse (1964) or Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and by feminist critiques of gender and its place in the construction of knowledge in works such as de Beauvoir (1973), Harding (1986) , and Keller (1985) , this position encourages research aimed at changing institutional and cultural relations to produce more just and equitable social practices. Selfe and Selfe (1996) , for example, argue that "teachers and students of nonacademic writing, like other informed and educated citizens, have a civic responsibility to work actively in both local and global arenas to challenge inequities based on oppression, and a civic obligation to enact positive social and political change" (pp. 325-326). Thus, work inspired by this position uses critique to disrupt commonsense assumptions and practices. Critics argue that researchers should consider ways to intervene in the rhetorical production of the dominant social order and produce studies that explore resistant communicative and political behavior in workplace settings (Herndl, 1993 (Herndl, , 1996 .
In Opening Spaces, P. Sullivan and Porter (1997) offer a discussion of theory and methodology that might best characterize this unregulated position in rhetorical research. They break from the straightjacket of opposing paradigms and reject the notion that postmodern theory is incompatible with empirical research. They also reject the traditional notion that research methodology aims at objectivity and can or should remain "unaffected by the situation under study" (p. 52). For them, research is situated activity, shaped by the personal, material, and ideological position of the researchers. Thus, they argue that critical research must maintain a consciousness of its own interests and purposes. Research and methodology can never be "ideologically innocent tools wielded in the construction of knowledge" (p. 12) but always constitute some practical action in the world.
We see methodology as invention, as the construction of a rhetorical design that contributes to an understanding but that also effects some kind of positive action through a rhetorical practice. Methodology is not merely a means to something else, it is itself an intervening social action and a participation in human events. (P. Sullivan & Porter, 1997, p. 13) Although they recognize the ideological nature of research as a situated practice, P. Sullivan and Porter also embrace the liberatory agenda of much recent feminist and Marxist-feminist work. Their book focuses on research on writing with computers, but their agenda is not merely archival; it is not one of describing user patterns or processes. In a chapter that offers a careful discussion of power, domination, and liberation, they articulate a research agenda and methodology that distinguishes between "uses of the computer that dominate and uses that empower and liberate" (p. 101). Their goal is to intervene in social practices and provide opportunities for liberatory change, however locally.
We call this a troublesome-or perhaps we should say troublemaking-position, to invoke Butler's (1990) analysis of gender and the body. Butler surveys the long feminist critique that argues that gender is a socially constructed category that has traditionally been deployed to dominate and marginalize women, their knowledge, and their social practices. She argues that both gender and the body, which is its visible site, are cultural performances, regulated by material and social conditions. And her analysis attempts to open a space for more and more varied gender performances.
The limits of the discursive analysis of gender presuppose and preempt the possibilities of imaginable and realizable gender configurations within a culture. . . . These limits are always set within the terms of a hegemonic cultural discourse predicated on binary structures that appear as the language of universal rationality. Constraint is thus built into what the language constitutes as the imaginable domain of gender. (Butler, 1990, p. 9) The purpose of her critique is to deconstruct the binary conception of gender and its innate naturalness and, in doing so, to make imaginable other possible configurations of being in the world.
Studies of technical and professional communication that emerge from this position tend to examine the consequences of communication practices for members of organizations, for the clients of organizations, or for social relations at large and to suggest possibilities for change. We talk here of possibilities for change because these studies have a very close epistemological horizon, recognizing that knowledge and action are contingent and local. As Selfe and Selfe (1996) argue, "We also recognize that such change is enacted only in ways that are partial, momentary, contradictory, and fragmented" (p. 326). Much of the work of these kinds of studies depends on a critique of accepted knowledge as historically or ideologically constructed and as serving specific social interests. Most researchers working in this tradition recognize the contingency of their own knowledge claims and actions. Despite the power and importance of empirical evidence in these sorts of arguments, their claims are ultimately grounded in self-acknowledged theoretical commitments and in the ethical consequences of action. As Lather (1991) argues, "such a stance provides the grounds for both an 'openly ideological' approach to critical inquiry and the necessary self-reflexivity, of growing awareness of how researcher values permeate inquiry" (p. 2). Researchers such as Lather occupy the resistance postmodernism Ebert (1991) describes, and they struggle to work within the conflict between their commitment to emancipatory action and the challenge to such global programs presented by postmodern theory. In the face of this conflicted situation, researchers explore new models of research methodology that openly question traditional notions of validity and objectivity. Action-oriented feminist ethnography, for example, attempts to construct a research practice that might see social projects such as feminist literacy work "as a compelling model of politically grounded research that does not reduce intellectual acts to political acts or vice versa" (Gordon, 1995, p. 376) . The difficulty with such programsand we will address it in a later section-is how to avoid a kind of theoretical imperialism that unilaterally imposes the researcher's theoretical agenda on the situation and participants.
We call this an unregulated context because the purposes of research at the right side of our model in Table 1 tend to be long-range change, and the consequences of actions are not usually immediate or catastrophic. This does not mean that researchers are not committed to action or that consequences are not important. And it does not mean that researchers work outside the constraints of their institutions and disciplines. Rather, the relationship between action and knowledge and the power that supports it is altered. In this unregulated position, research struggles against institutional regulation and the forms of knowledge, identity, and action that are taken for granted as natural. Researchers often make the ideological interests of powerful institutions the explicit object of analysis and criticism. Action is often based not on an abstract and absolute notion of truth but on a social truth measured against both theoretical constructions and likely consequences of action.
In terms more familiar in rhetoric, work at the right end of this continuum tends to be dedicated toward some version of what C. R. Miller (1989) calls phronesis and what other writers such as T. P. Miller (1991) and D. L. Sullivan (1990) refer to as praxis. C. R. Miller (1989) argues that "the reasoning appropriate to performance, or conduct, takes the form of phronesis, prudence . . . prudence is concerned with the good (that is, with the quality of the expectations [of a product] themselves)" (p. 22). This characterization not only anticipates Butler's (1990) argument that gender and identity are performances but also connects, as C. R. Miller (1989) notes, to Marx's notion of praxis. Critics such as T. P. Miller and D. L. Sullivan have argued that technical and professional communication should be considered as a form of praxis because humans are the product of the work in which they engage. T. P. Miller (1991) argues that such a position leads to use of the hermeneutical strategies of ethnography not just for research but also for teaching. In this way, we can teach our students how to interpret the shared assumptions and values of a professional community and apply them to solve its practical problems in ways that serve public needs [italics added]. (p. 71) We take public needs here not in a restrictive sense but as a reference to a wider understanding of the civic responsibility to which Selfe and Selfe (1996) refer or to what Wells (1996) has recently called the public sphere. These public needs correspond to Segal et al.'s (1998) sense of "'better' in its ideological sense-more equitable, democratic, and just" (p. 75). As they describe their own qualitative research and consulting, they say that "by providing a discursive awareness that may be potentially disruptive, we are not simply doing what we think is best for some practitioners, but what we think is best for the entire community, especially those with little or no power" (p. 79).
Such civic responsibility-in both the workplace and the classroomdrives the work of those researchers we discuss here as representative of the right-hand side of our continuum in Table 1 : Sauer (1993) , Waddell (1996) , and Henry (in press). In her feminist discourse analysis of the investigation report of a 1981 Kentucky underground mine coal dust explosion, Sauer (1993) "reveals how the conventions of public discourse privilege the rational objective voice and exclude expression of the human suffering of miners" (p. 68)-conventions such as placing victims' names in an appendix, using passive verbs and quasipassive adjectives, preparing a report for the record using technical language instead of one that makes recommendations or offers solutions. And in her discussion of women's testimonies at the hearings (many of those women being widows of the miners killed in the explosion), Sauer points out the contrast between the sense of the women's testimony and the sensibility of the investigation report, arguing that their testimony is not taken seriously because they do not talk the talk of the investigation report or of those holding the hearing. It is in her conclusion, however, that Sauer speaks the most clearly and passionately of what she sees as qualitative researchers' responsibility to conduct research that makes a difference in humans' lives-a passage illustrating phronesis:
A feminist perspective allows researchers to analyze the symbols, formats, and processes that silence the human element in objective scientific discourse, not merely to alter power relationships but to improve the lives and safety of workers. In this sense, feminism forces us to acknowledge the moral and ethical power of language as well as the political power of language. (p. 78) Similar to Sauer (1993) , Waddell (1996) focuses on public testimony at hearings-on governmental policies that can have a profound effect on the quality of human life. As does Sauer (1993) , Waddell (1996) argues against positivistic notions of objectivity and value-free language: "To some extent, our increased recognition of the subjective side of science-in part, a contribution of history, philosophy, sociology, and the rhetoric of science-has legitimized the subjective aspects of public participation in environmental and science policy disputes" (p. 144). Waddell points out that not only citizens but also technical experts used emotional appeals in speaking at the 1991 International Joint Commission's Sixth Biennial Meeting on Great Lakes Water Quality. He argues for a social constructionist model for public participation in which the "values, beliefs, and emotions" of not only the public but also of "experts in science, engineering, industry, and government . . . play a significant part in risk communication and environmental policy formation" (p. 142). Such a model, he predicts, "should have significant implications for the expansion of democratic governance and the decentralization of political power. Hence, I propose this model both as a description of emerging public practice and as a prescription for enhancing public participation in environmental and science policy disputes" (p. 158).
Henry (in press) turns his attention to the classroom-specifically, to the Cultures of Professional Writing graduate course he teaches, a course whose research goals are "first to capture 'the way things have always been done' in a given local culture, then to reflect critically upon these local practices and imagine possible alternatives, including alternative discursive formations and attendant subject positions" (chap. 1). He developed this course in response to what he saw as a limited motivation to workplace writing studies: "Most often they are conducted exclusively to utilitarian ends, owing to funding, and focus not on writers so much as the writing. Such research thus ignores subjectivities because they are deemed irrelevant" (chap. 1). Henry, however, sees subjectivities and the possibility of opening them to scrutiny and change as extremely relevant-much as Sauer (1993) and Waddell (1996) see emotion as having relevance in policy hearings.
Similar to the left side of the continuum, the right side is not sacrosanct or set apart from the descriptive middle ground (see Table 1 ). Articles and authors move back and forth between the descriptive center and the right side committed to change, reflecting multiple purposes and goals. In a recent article, Sauer (1998) examines "embodied knowledge," the kind of "pit sense" miners acquire on the job and the intuitive knowledge they know with their hands. Her analysis entails a great deal of archival detail about mining safety and regulatory discourse, but her work also argues for change in the way embodied sensory knowledge is recognized and how it is represented in writing. This involves a critique of procedures and instructions as rules for rational control of the environment. In the very risky environment of a coal mine, Sauer (1998) argues, action comes before knowledge, forcing a rethinking of notions of instructions and procedures:
The dynamic and uncertain environment of a coal mine thus raises ethical questions about textbook notions of instructions as systematic procedures designed to translate expert knowledge to lay audiences or to prescribe safe behaviors for highly local and unpredictable environments. (p. 160)
As she examines the scientific, engineering, and regulatory discourse of mine safety, she demonstrates the importance of miners' embodied knowledge and argues "that engineers, scientists, and workers can work together to construct equipment, policy, and procedures that meet the needs of users [miners] in complex and difficult material environments" (p. 161). In making this argument, Sauer advocates a reevaluation of miners' embodied knowledge and a revision of policy and procedures to better incorporate this knowledge and serve miners' safety needs. Thus, her work here seems to straddle the distinction between archival and unregulated purposes, or more accurately, it incorporates both.
It is to the struggle-between tradition and innovation, between maintenance and change-that we now turn our attention.
PROBLEMS FACING QUALITATIVE RESEARCHERS
The task of producing a useful and adequate account of social activity that both researchers and their audiences will accept as valid and on which people will act is a vexed affair, as problematic as any current intellectual project. What once seemed so straightforward if difficult a task to early anthropologists is now crossed by an intimidating array of theoretical challenges. The range of problems facing researchers is articulated by Lather (1991) when she writes, What is foregrounded in this definition [Lyotard's] is the postmodern break with totalizing, universalizing "metanarratives" and the humanist view of the subject that undergirds them. Humanism posits the subject as an autonomous individual capable of full consciousness and endowed with a stable "self" constituted by a set of static characteristics such as sex, class, race, and sexual orientation. . . . Such a subject has been decentered, refashioned as a site of disarray and conflict inscribed by multiple contestatory discourses. "Grand narratives" are displaced by "the contingent, messy, boundless, infinitely particular, and endlessly still to be explained" (Murdock, quoted in Spanos, 1987, p. 240). (pp. 5-6) As Lather's (1991) comment suggests, researchers at all positions in our model confront theoretical problems with their methodology and struggle with the difficulties of doing qualitative research that leads to action-archival, instrumental, or disruptive. In considering the problems facing researchers, we distinguish between field methods and methodology, and we make one contestable assumption. Researchers of whatever sort and relation to institutional power follow essentially the same data-gathering methods. Field-workers observe activity, take notes, collect artifacts, interview informants, and do so with care and rigor whatever their purposes and position on our continuum. What varies much more widely is their methodology, the theoretical frameworks that guide data analysis and justify research, and the textual practices through which researchers report their work (Schratz & Walker, 1995, pp. 1-14) .
MODERNIST CHALLENGES
In many respects, research on the left side of our model (see Table 1 ), research that maintains social relations and their interests, faces the least practical difficulty. Qualitative research that investigates welldefined problems to which business, industry, or the academy would like effective responses can draw on rhetorical practices authorized by their ability to serve those institutional needs. Because studies such as these tend to share the purposes and rhetorical strategies of powerful social institutions and report their findings in the topoi common to those institutional discourses, they face relatively few problems in justifying and reporting their work. After all, people don't usually argue when you give them what they want.
The problems facing this sort of instrumental research are more theoretical than institutional and tend to fall into one of two rough categories: metaphysical and social. In the passage that opens the preceding section, Lather (1991) summarizes three decades of poststructural critique of Enlightenment metaphysics based on a unified, selfconscious, subject capable of the rational perception of a stable reality.
In doing so, she articulates a theoretical position that is widely argued in philosophy and critical theory and that constitutes the metaphysical challenge to instrumental qualitative research practices. The second category of problem facing researchers on the left side of our model in Table 1 comes closest to our earlier argument that research practices are social activities that exist at the intersection of structural conditions and lived experience. This theory of practice led us to ask about the kinds of work qualitative research does and the interests it serves because social practices, including academic research, are fundamentally recursive. That is, they emerge from the interaction of lived experience and social structures, but they also shape the world in which we live, making possible forms of lived experience and affecting structural conditions. This is Giddens's (1984) essential insight when he argues that the principles that structure social activity are the medium of social activity as well as its outcome (also see Herndl, 1996) . And it is one of Butler's (1990) points when she argues that gender identity is a performance that makes possible future performances and ways of being. This is the sense in which we want to consider the consequences of qualitative research practices. Whereas (self-)regulated instrumental research often gets the immediate job done-improves a process or product-it ignores the extended or unintended consequences of research as social action. One way to illustrate what we mean here is to briefly examine the critique of technology and its relation to culture produced by critical theory.
Critical theory has long argued that technology is a powerful and dangerous force in modern society. Heidegger (1977) , for example, argues that technology produced a relationship in which people set upon the world to unlock and transform it into a standing reserve of energy that can be used. But for Heidegger, this process also "gathers man into the ordering" and reduces both human beings and nature to "the objectlessness of the standing-reserve" (p. 300), a radical reduction of both the human and the natural in an ineluctable technological process of domination and control. More recent work in critical theory, however, moves beyond this rejection of technology and has produced a powerful critique that also offers possibilities for an emancipatory relationship between technology and social order. Feenberg (1991) rejects Heidegger's (1977) fatalist view of technology and argues that Heidegger and many other critics of technology fail to distinguish between what he calls the primary and secondary instrumentalizations of technology. In its primary instrumentality, technology is seen as socially or politically neutral by its advocates, as corrupting by its detractors. Feenberg (1991) argues that this is a formal and artificial neutrality that appears only when technology or technique is abstracted from the social context in which it operates. Feenberg's advance over earlier work comes when he argues that technology operates within a social order that provides the goals and purposes to which technology is put; thus, technology does have a kind of relative neutrality, and the frequently repressive effects of technology come from "the prejudicial choice of the time, place, and manner of the introduction of a relatively neutral system" (p. 180) into an existing social order. Feenberg argues that seeing technology as inherently bad or repressive as Heidegger (1977) does mistakes the essence of technology for the social structure in which technology operates. This distinction leads Feenberg (1991) to define a secondary instrumentality, which considers the ways technology intersects with other systems of social action. Thus, Feenberg's revised theory of technology focuses attention on the social practices in which technology is embedded. Because the formal neutrality of technology always favors the existing social relations, Feenberg calls for a "reflexive metatechnical practice" that examines technology and its products as raw materials for intervening in social activity and activating the less repressive "potentialities" of technology (p. 183).
Feenberg's (1991) theory of secondary instrumentalization offers a way to think about the social role of qualitative research in technical and professional communication. Qualitative studies that pursue a narrowly instrumental purpose participate in Feenberg's primary instrumentalization in which technology and technique are abstracted from social context and considered in isolation. As a social practice, this research concentrates on immediate consequences of control and efficiency but fails to consider the unintended social consequences of action, Feenberg's secondary instrumentalization. Thus, in studies of organizational communication, scholars such as Deetz and Kersten argue that as organizations focus on "economic activities and control over nature," their "goals are commonly viewed in terms of economic growth, profit, or continued organizational survival. Other goals, such as the welfare of organizational participants, are subordinated to this goal and have only instrumental importance." (quoted in Blyler, 1995, p. 294) The similarities here to Feenberg's (1991) language are clear, and they suggest that the challenge to qualitative researchers on the left side of our model in Table 1 is to enact some version of Feenberg's reflexive metatechnical practice, which considers the unintended and extended social consequences of research practices.
POSTMODERN DILEMMAS
Qualitative researchers working at the right side of our model (see Table 1 ), like all researchers working within the postmodern, face equally daunting if very different problems. These problems are both practical and ethical. Unlike the opposite end of the model, research on the right side of the model has a less immediate relationship to action and often faces entrenched resistance.
2 Motivating action is difficult when one's political position is essentially disruptive. Critique has historically struggled to produce positive agendas and convince people to take action. The disruptive politics of intervention at this end of the model tends to produce a rhetorical strategy, such as that of Williams's (1961) long revolution or the progressive consciousness raising of the early feminist movement. But as the comparison to the feminist movement also suggests, action is not impossible, and social change is a viable goal.
For at least a decade, postmodern critiques of qualitative research have produced compelling analyses of the difficulties of textual representation and disciplinary authority. And although we agree with these critiques, we argue that these problems are essentially ethical issues. As a social practice, qualitative research not only describes the world but also participates in constructing individuals' relations within it and, thus, their relations with others. When researchers construct representations of the experiences of others and then validate those accounts through formal disciplinary codes, they engage in a social activity that affects and perhaps even infringes upon the lives and subjectivity of others. Not only do disciplinary methodologies ground representational practices and claims to authority, but they also tend to usurp the ethical responsibility that had attached to the individual researcher. In his analysis of the consequences of postmodernity, Bauman (1992) argues that in a modernist society with a unified and quasimonopolistic social authority, social agents ceded away much of their ethical responsibility to the authority of a rational standard, but the contemporary "pluralism of authority is conducive to the resumption by the agents of moral responsibility" (p. 202). In qualitative research, methodology with its detailed and rationally justified procedures served a similar function; researchers' actions were warranted by methods and procedures authorized by their disciplines. In the current methodological pluralism, however, this certainty no longer holds. Thus, as Schwandt (1997) argues, the debates over authority, representation, and validity become ethical dilemmas as the ethical burden shifts back to the individual researcher. Although this is not an altogether new argument-Doheny-Farina (1993) recognized that representation and ethnographic authority were essentially ethical issues when he wrote that "our strongest authority [in qualitative research] comes not from our representational data, but in our attempt to do ethical research" (p. 254)-it is an argument that has not been adequately taken up by researchers in rhetoric and technical communication.
But doing ethical research in the postmodern age is easier said than done. The nature of the dilemma is described nicely by Bauman (1992) :
The ethical paradox of the postmodern condition is that it restores to agents the fullness of moral choice and responsibility while simultaneously depriving them of the comfort of the universal guidance that modern self-confidence once promised. Ethical tasks of individuals grow while the socially produced resources to fulfill them shrink. . . . This is because behind the postmodern ethical paradox hides a genuine practical dilemma: acting on one's moral convictions is naturally pregnant with a desire to win for such convictions an ever more universal acceptance; but every attempt to do so just smacks of the already discredited bid for domination. (pp. xxii-xxiii) Researchers working "with/in" the postmodern, to borrow Lather's (1991) term, are denied the certainty of a rationally grounded ethical code or method modeled on the law. Instead of facing ethical problems for which there are or could be solutions, researchers with or in the postmodern face an ongoing series of choices, few of them unambiguous. As Bauman (1993) argues, moral choices are negotiated between contradictory impulses. Most importantly, however, virtually every moral impulse, if acted upon in full, leads to immoral consequences (most characteristically, the impulse to care for the Other, when taken to its extreme, leads to the annihilation of the Other, to domination and oppression). (p. 11) Qualitative researchers face at least two such problems: (a) the difficulty of including the voices of the social agents they study without usurping their autonomy and (b) what we earlier referred to as a theoretical imperialism, in which the researcher's theoretical commitment dominates both the scene under study and the social actors in it-a theoretical procrustean bed.
The anxiety produced by this ethical dilemma is ineluctable. It is the nature of the postmodern situation and the mark of moral responsibility. The postmodern moral agent is always haunted by the fear that he or she did not do enough. This ethics of anxiety is both imprecise and open-ended. It is, as Bauman (1993) notes with some understatement, "not the kind of ethical foundation philosophers dreamt of and go on dreaming of. It leaves a lot to be desired." (p. 80). Similar to social practices, postmodern ethics is an ongoing and uncertain process of self-monitoring and self-reflection. In the absence and impossibility of any ontological ground for ethics, it is, Bauman argues, "the act of looking there [before ontological grounds] which founds the moral self" (p. 76). For postmodern qualitative researchers, it is not only the act of looking but also making readers look that grounds morality and directs practice.
From the perspective of Bauman's (1992 Bauman's ( , 1993 postmodern theory, the postmodern qualitative researcher is engaged in an uncertain but highly ethical project. He or she no longer cedes ethical responsibility to disciplinary codes and methods. As a result, the researcher has the potential to become a more ethically responsible social agent than many other researchers. But as researchers struggle to effect social change, they must negotiate relations of power and institutional interests that often limit their efficacy. In discussing their consulting work, Segal et al. (1998, pp. 82-88) nicely articulate just this sort of dilemma. They warn readers about the possible arrogance of the "missionary position" of social critique, and they offer suggestions for initiating social change gleaned from their own practice. The alternatives they suggest are all sensitive to participants and their situation, engaged not only with social critique but also the subjectivity and interests of the people in the workplaces into which they bring their research and theory.
CONCLUSION
Our affiliations with the postmodern and its critique of power as well as our fondness for a theory of social practice are clear in what has come before. We have offered a model of qualitative research in technical and professional communication that understands research as a social practice, and we have argued that such practices can work to maintain or change institutional relations of power. Our model is designed to highlight the problems facing researchers who want their research to lead to action so that we can better describe the dilemmas researchers face and suggest new ways to approach them. We also believe that a model of research as a continuum of social practices does a better job than the more traditional model of research paradigms does at showing the range of research practices and their political effects-research sometimes including, as we have shown, characteristics of different points on our continuum. By moving beyond the metaphysically oriented, static, and reified notion of paradigm and coming to see qualitative research as a continuum of dynamic social practices, theorists and researchers can more easily focus not only on the practices of others but also on their own, thereby better connecting and negotiating the interests and purposes of both. In doing so, qualitative researchers have a better chance of negotiating the conflicting interests they and their students face. Such a revised perspective crosses, expands, and even breaks down paradigmatic and other boundaries, making possible connections among research, theory, pedagogy, and workplace writing practices in ways that can foster critical research that is both ethically self-conscious and more efficacious.
But similar to Bauman's (1992 Bauman's ( , 1993 postmodern moral agent, we as qualitative researchers know that there is more to be done. Building on the work of Bauman, we need studies exploring the impact that postmodern ethics has on fieldwork. We also need historical critiques of technical and professional communication research practices that are aimed at explaining kinds of change and exploring the sources and motives of such change in this emergent discipline. Finally, we need pedagogical strategies of praxis for introducing issues of power and the connection of discourse to social change-strategies that help students come to the understanding that language is value laden and context specific and that their uses of such language have ethical consequences. By engaging in such work, qualitative researchers can enrich the technical and professional communication archive and, ultimately, the discipline as a whole.
NOTES
1. To make matters somewhat more complex, Dautermann's (1997) book might appear to move toward the more disruptive research practice. Briefly in the introduction and again on the last page, she discusses hierarchical relations of power that operate within the hospital and comments that "rhetorically talented nurses" could use their skills to "challenge such institutions from within" (p. 127). In our reading, however, this is not a central theme developed throughout the book; it seems more an interesting suggestion for further research.
2. Critics might object to our claim that the disruptive research practices located on the right side of our model (see Table 1 ) face entrenched resistance. Certainly academic criticism fosters and even rewards ideological critique in ways that nonacademic and industry environments do not. But we think it is dangerous to separate the academic ethos from the ethos of industry quite this sharply. Especially for technical and professional writing programs that often cultivate close, cooperative relations with industry, this separation is increasingly artificial. Programs have formalized, sometimes financial relations with large corporations. Faculty members often teach and pursue lucrative consulting careers with industry. Less directly, the practical orientation of the textbook tradition brings the ethos of industry and instrumentality into academic programs and into research agendas.
